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ABSTRACT
Can deliberate political instability, including terrorism and/or political
violence, have an effect on changing formal political institutions? This
paper offers two major contributions toward answering this question,
one focused on data and one focused on methodology. In the first
instance, this paper introduces a brand-new dataset of monthly political
instability in Russia from 1788 to 1914; Czarist Russia was a country
plagued by informal instability and political violence throughout the
nineteenth century, and which saw waves of reform and reaction. As
such, it makes an excellent test case for examining the relationship
between informal political instability and formal political change.
Secondly, in order to trace the evolution of Russia’s political institutions
in the presence of various forms of instability, I utilize non-traditional
estimation in the form of Poisson, IV-Poisson-GMM, and logistic regres-
sions to account for the slow-moving nature of political regime change.
The results of these estimations show that some forms of instability did
indeed “work” in forcing amodicum of liberalization. On the other hand,
large-scale unrest or external conflict had no correlation with political
regime change and actually appeared to be counterproductive.
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Introduction
Perhaps not surprisingly, there is an impressive body of research in political science—as well
as in economics—on political instability. In particular, the extant literature has focused on the
effects of political instability on economic growth1 and other economic attributes such as
investment,2 and how instability affects various political institutional settings such as democ-
racy or autocracy,3 or is in turn influenced by existing institutions.4 In each of these instances,
political instability has been treated either as an exogenous occurrence or a phenomenon
contemporaneous with other outcomes, mainly in an attempt to draw a clear line of causality
from instability to specific metrics (or from political institutions to instability).
However, as we know from historical episodes globally, political instability is not in
actuality an exogenous shock, but is usually generated endogenously on purpose as a tactic
to influence the political system.5 This deliberate instability can take many forms: at the
individual level, it can manifest itself in political violence or terrorism, directed at symbols
of (or actual representatives of) a particular regime. Such instability could be planned or
spontaneous, organized by a group or carried out by a “lone wolf,” but it is generally
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carried out via individual agency in service of a political goal. At the same time, deliberate
instability can encompass collective action-based events such as strikes, demonstrations,
revolts, or armed rebellion, and like individual actions, they may be either spontaneous or
organized. Finally, these bouts of deliberate instability may be further exacerbated by the
external position of a country, especially if they are undergoing armed conflict with
another state6 and/if it is going poorly.7
Given this variety of types of deliberate political instability, the question becomes, does the
instigation of political violence or targeted uprisings “work?” That is, can either individual acts
of terrorism or collective acts of rebellion force regime change or, at the very least, create space
for reform? And if so, which modalities are most effective? The heterogeneity of political
violence may mean that some variants of terrorism may help to force a regime to political
concessions, while at different times and in different circumstances, collective action may be
the driver of regime change. In any event, there has been very little work testing the
effectiveness of certain types of deliberate instability on either generating reform in existing
political institutions and/or creating momentum toward systemic change in the long run;
indeed, much of the literature has focused on either regime change or territorial concessions
as a result of specific events of political instability, rather than stepping back and observing the
effect of various types of instability exercised over a long period of time. This is especially
crucial given the reality that political instability does not occur instantaneously, but often
builds over a long period of time and tends to display a high level of persistence.8
Perhaps the largest example of regime change begat from deliberate instability occurred in
Russia in 1917, following over a century of assassinations (both attempted and actual), peasant
rebellions, strikes, andwar. The purpose of this paper is to revisit our understanding the effects of
political violence and instability on institutional structures over the long-term, using Russia as
a case study. The overall weakness of the political system in Czarist Russia and its proclivity
toward paroxysms of violence makes the country a perfect testing ground for examining the
effectiveness of deliberate political instability in changing the character of the regime. While we
have a wealth of historical accounts and political history regarding separate episodes of political
instability, we have very little concrete statistical relationships between the two. Did terrorism,
amanifestation of political volatility, have a tangible effect on the Russian regime?Did organized
uprisings help to nudge Russia toward a more liberal democracy, or did it just engender
a conservative backlash? Did different forms of deliberate instability work better or worse in
forcing change?
This paper makes two major contributions to the existing literature: in the first
instance, in order to test the hypotheses above, the paper introduces a brand-new and
wholly unique monthly database of terrorism and political instability in Czarist Russia
monthly from 1788 to 1914. Drawing on newspapers, published literature, and official
records, I have created the most comprehensive database on informal political instability
in Russia, delineated by type of instability and location.
The second major contribution of this paper is methodological: while the existing
research, as mentioned above, focuses on the democratic consequences of political
instability—mainly on public opinion and voting patterns—this note eschews (much as
the Czar did) popular opinion to test directly if various terrorist acts were correlated with
liberalization of the regime. This entails both using a new measure of regime openness
which measures access to the political system and, more importantly, econometric tech-
niques only beginning to be used in the study of institutions.9 The reality of institutional
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change is that it is slow-moving even over a period as long as 126 years, and to treat it as
a continuous rather than lumpy process would result in biased or inaccurate results. Using
the MaxRange indicator of political regimes,10 this paper corrects for this persistent
oversight in applying count data methods to understand how repeated political instability
can affect infrequent formal political shifts.
The econometric results presented here show that individual acts of terror did in fact help
to push Russia toward liberalism, while broad-based collective action in the form of uprisings
and revolts appear to have a negative effect. In particular, successful assassinations in Russia
and throughout the Empire appear to be correlated with some gradual liberalization of the
political system, while large scale unrest and external conflict conversely led to strengthening
of Czarist repression. Most importantly, terrorism was most effective when the country was at
its most restrictive, being counterproductive once some measure of liberalization had been
attained. These results have ramifications for the wider political science and economics
literature beyond the specific case of Russia, as they show that the heterogeneity of political
instability must be considered when ascertaining its possible effect on various regimes.
Theoretical background
The study of political instability has a long pedigree in political science and economics, with the
extant literature bifurcated into examinations of the drivers of political instability and examina-
tions of the effects. For the purposes of this paper, there is less relevance of the drivers of political
instability, as it has been amply covered by others (see an excellent example in11); indeed, the
literature has explored various forms of instability and attributed their onset or persistence to
inter alia the level of economic development,12 specific economic policies,13 inequality and
relatively unequal distribution of wealth,14 proximity to instability,15 and population size and
their natural surroundings.16 More important for our purposes is the research exploring how
political instability occurs under different types of regimes,17 and in particular the reality that
political violence and deliberate instability is often the only way to influence the system.18 Simply
put, given the closed nature of decision-making in an authoritarian—and also a monarchical19
—regime, various forms of political instability may have the overt goal of either changing
policies within the system or overthrowing the regime and existing political institutions entirely
(a driver of instability often, but not entirely, missing from democratic regimes).
Of greater relevance for this study is the existing literature focusing on the effects of various
types of political instability, with most of the research in this vein focusing on either: (a) the
modality of instability and agency, (b) the environment in which it occurs, and (c) the
channels by which the instability influences formal political institutions. In reality, however,
the papers focused on the mode of instability have been highly aggregated, a consequence of
the fact (as 20[1] note) that “state-level political instability [is] a catch-all category encom-
passing civil wars, democratic reversals, genocides and politicides, and state collapse.” This
imprecision on the heterogeneity of deliberate political instability has then been reflected in
empirical treatments of instability, with one of the most highly cited papers21 using a principal
components analysis to lump different types of instability together. The reality of the hetero-
geneity of deliberate political instability has been examined elsewhere in the literature, mainly,
in single country studies, but usually with a focus on a particular type of instability, be it
terrorism and political violence,22 revolution,23 external pressure,24 or civil war,25 rather than
holistically approaching the spectrum of instability together.26
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Along these lines, and similar to the drivers of political instability, the political
science literature has homed in on the effectiveness of political instability in influencing
a regime as dependent upon what sort of regime it is and, in particular, the state’s
capacity; this stratification by regime/strength thus also determines the channels by
which a particular act of deliberate political instability may influence the regime, as not
all channels are available in a monarchy or autocracy but which may be available in
a democracy. For example, rather than studying the ability of targeted instability to
directly alter political institutions, papers focused on democracies instead trace out the
effect that political violence (as an example) has on the polity: for instance,27 notes that
acts of terror without obvious political messages tend to harden attitudes against the
perpetrators rather than create waves of sympathy, while violence against civilian
targets also can harden a government’s own resolve (on the other hand, military-
related attacks can extract concessions from a government).28 On the other hand,
suicide bombings are regularly employed because they do actually work in forcing
change of political policies, with a long list of territorial concessions in the 1980s and
1990s coming about due to increased political violence29; this could be because indivi-
dual terrorist attacks could force the populace to become more dovish30 or more
religious.31 In the aggregate, democracies tend to have the most to lose from bouts of
sociopolitical instability, which may also be a factor in determining how individuals,
non-state actors, or collective action may influence the regime.32
Autocracies and monarchies, on the other hand, are famously more stable and less affected
by political instability in discrete bursts,33 mainly due to either an ability to co-opt the
rebellious34 or via the mechanisms of repression which raise the cost of deliberate political
instability, either at the individual35 or collective level.36 In theory, this leads to fewer
incidences of political violence than in democracies,37 but a corollary of this work makes
such an outcome dependent upon the strength of the regime: intuitively, if political violence,
terrorism, or large-scale unrest should occur in a weaker institutional environment, such
political instability can be plausibly expected to have at least the probability of a modicum of
success in changing the political order. The precise reason why terrorist attacks in a weak
institutional environment may generate large responses is that repeated terrorist attacks can
weaken a regime and perhaps even cause regime change. Indeed, the timing of terrorism
itself in democracies is influenced by political cycles and the strength of incumbent
governments,38 but as also shown in,39 terrorism may be most effective when used against
weaker political institutions (“incomplete autocracies”), and governments perceived as hav-
ing weaknesses may even invite more and specific types of terrorism or other types of
political instability.40 In such an environment, repeated deliberate political instability may
actually be “feeling out” what is the best way to strike at an authoritarian regime, contingent
on the costs incurred by merely existing within an authoritarian regime.
Examining the spectrum of instability in Czarist Russia
Russia under the Czars
The pre-revolutionary Russian Empire, with a political system built around the personage of
the Czar, was well-known for having weak political institutions underpinning the state.41
Specifically, Czarist Russia was characterized by a corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy,
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overlapping administrative centers, and sudden shifts of policy due to the whims of the Czar
himself. At the same time, however, the Czar’s power was absolute, with an extensive security
and regulatory apparatus which “maintained the state’s priority over the individual,” preser-
ving a system which “stubbornly resisted fundamental change.42”
The absolutist nature of the monarchy left no opportunities for political expression in
the country throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, meaning any reforms
which did occur came about as a result of bargaining within the elite structure and not
from the Czar’s subjects. Given the vast expanse of Russian territory (making the cost of
administration high and requiring an elaborate system to ensure that the Czar’s diktats
reached to the hinterlands) and the relatively uneducated state of the populace (43 notes
that, by 1897, only about 20 percent of the population could sign their own name), the
Russian political system was built on subservience, meaning any move toward political
consciousness would be lighting the spark to the Russian powder-keg. Coupled with global
movements such as the revolutions of 1848, the rise of socialism, and the disruption of the
industrial revolution, political violence in all its forms became the preferred outlet for the
political discontent of the bourgeoise44 (see Figure 1). During this era, Russia thus became
the birthplace of the modern variants of political violence, mainly targeted assassinations,
bombings, and organized uprisings, with instability in Czarist Russia used exclusively for
political ends, aimed at the political system in an attempt to either overthrow it or replace
it wholesale.45 Moving from mass unrest in the early nineteenth century, before the
emancipation of the serfs in 1861, to revolutionary violence shortly thereafter and up
until 1917, Russia ran the gamut of deliberate political instability.
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Figure 1. Cumulative number of uprisings/rebellions over the previous 12 months in Russia.
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Empirical strategy and methodology
These stylized facts make Russia an excellent test case to understand the effects of various
types of political instability on political institutions. To test for these effects econometri-
cally, I employ an identification strategy which draws on the extant political science and
economics literature to sketch a theory of political institutional change.
The accumulation of current research in this vein posits that the drivers of political
change in general (and not just political instability) are many, including: endogenous
changes in the ruling class (such as innate personality traits of leaders46), underlying
political currents (including changes in prevailing ideas or narratives47 and the current
state of power relations,48 global waves of political change or changes in neighboring
countries,49 ability for rulers to access resources to quell potentially troubling
opposition,50 overall economic conditions,51 and, important for our purposes, the various
manifestations of political instability.
These factors can be consolidated into three specific vectors as part of a formal model:
To apply this model to the Russian case, the Y variable in Equation 1 is the first hurdle,
as broad annual indicators of political openness and/or executive constraints such as the
Polity IV dataset show no variation for Russia throughout the entire 126 years under the
Czar available in the data. Much better for the purpose outlined here is a monthly
database of political indicators produced by researchers at Halmstad University in
Sweden, covering political institutions and regime types on a monthly basis from 1789
to the present day.52
Yt ¼ αþ γ POLITICAL INSTABILITYt þ β POLITICAL INSTITUTIONSt
þ δ ECONOMIC  CONDITIONSt þ t (1)
The “MaxRange” dataset offers a new way to conceptualize the extent of democratic
access to the political system, and the headline “regime value” measure used here allows
for fine gradations in the type of political institutions that exist in a country. Coded from 0
to 100, with higher numbers representing more democratic access and greater executive
constraints, the regime value variable encapsulates the checks and balances within
a system, particular institutional arrangements, and political competition. Thus, the use
of the MaxRange regime variable is taken to be an imperfect proxy for political institu-
tional change, albeit one which is directly related to our question of interest.
Turning to measuring terrorism itself, as noted above, a problem of existing literature is
that it either collapses political volatility into one vector via principal components analysis
(ignoring the heterogeneity of instability), or instead focuses only on one type of instabil-
ity (e.g. terrorism or uprisings). To rectify this in the Russian case, I have created a brand-
new monthly database which classifies political instability across the Russian empire from
1788 to 1914 according to its modality, target, and location (the taxonomy is shown in
Table 1 and summary statistics for the data are given in Appendix A, Table A1).53
Drawing on several Russian- and English-language sources (see Data Appendix), the
taxonomy follows from insights on the heterogeneity of terror.54 For the purposes of
Equation 1, the month in which a particular act of volatility occurred is coded as a 1 and
a 0 if no terrorism or unrest occurred. As attacks need to be substantial in order to induce
any sort of attitudinal shift,55 the database focuses only on “major” events, as described in
Table 1.56
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In addition to utilizing dummies for discrete terrorist events, it is perhaps more
interesting to see if prolonged political instability had a bigger impact on the Czarist
regime. To that end, the database also contains cumulative measures of terrorism, coded
from 0 to 12, signifying the number of months in which a terrorist attack occurred within
the previous twelve months. For example, if—as during the height of the socialist revolu-
tionary campaign against the Czar—there were assassinations in each of the preceding
ten months, a month would be coded as 10 in the database.
For the covariates shown in Equation 1, we are both helped and hindered. In the help
column, the stability of the monarchy means that there was little endogenous political
change, while political events such as elections were non-existent; thus, the Political
Institutions variable in Equation 1 is a dummy for the month in which there was
a transition of Czars due to death, the only reason why the regime would change absent
revolution or conscious design.57
From the hindrance side, however, the paucity of monthly data on economic conditions
in Czarist Russia means we will likely be unable to control for all of the various economic
realities which could contribute to political change. In the first instance, although Russia
was not highly integrated into global markets, it became more so over the nineteenth
century and was sensitive to global economic conditions; for this reason, we include the
price of gold in New York as a proxy for the world economy. Similarly, there are little
indicators available for Russian economic conditions prior to 1880 (and even the indus-
trial production indices which exist are on an annual basis). Thus, as a crude approxima-
tion of Russian economic prospects, we use ruble/Dutch guilder exchange rates, which
have the bonus of having a monthly time series back to the 1700s.
As noted in the introduction, a difficulty in measuring institutional change directly is
that traditional estimators treat change as continual, when in reality institutions are semi-
permanent and given to long periods of stasis and sudden, abrupt changes (this is
especially true in the quantification of institutions). This is indeed the case with the
MaxRange variable, which is slow-moving over the period of 1789 to 1914 and shows
only two discrete shifts. Given this reality, two estimation techniques are used to account
for the slow-moving nature of institutional change: first, a negative binomial regression
modeling the regime changes as similar to count data58 or, more accurately, as an
exceptional event of varying probability59; and second, an instrumental variable Poisson
Table 1. Classification of informal political volatility in Czarist Russia.
Type of volatility Definition
Attempted assassinations
Russia
An attack (bombing, mass shooting) which resulted in fatalities but was unsuccessful in
assassinating the main target (Russian territory only, excluding the Caucasus, Poland,
Ukraine, and Central Asia)
Attempted assassinations
Empire
An attack (bombing, mass shooting) which resulted in fatalities but was unsuccessful in
assassinating the main target (Russian Empire only, including the Caucasus, Poland, Ukraine,
and Central Asia)
Assassinations Russia A major public figure was assassinated on the territory of Russia; if shot in one month and
died in another, month is coded 1 from the attack itself
Assassinations Empire A major public figure was assassinated on the territory of the Russian Empire, including the
Caucasus, Poland, Ukraine, and Central Asia. Same coding as above
Unrest Russia Strikes, peasant uprisings, or other mass movements which resulted in fatalities or the use of
state force to suppress; territory of Russia only
Unrest Empire Same as unrest but only in Caucasus, Poland, Ukraine, and Central Asia
External Conflict Russia’s involvement in external conflict, wars, or interventions abroad
TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 7
generalized method of moments (IV Poisson-GMM) estimator to account for both the
stochastic nature of regime change and possible endogeneity among the explanatory
variables.60
The negative binomial model treats the slow-moving regime value Yi as having a Poisson-
gamma mixture distribution, where the mean of the regime value (denoted as μ) is condi-
tioned on a baseline matrix of covariates Xt (including acts of terrorism) which describe the
characteristics of Russia’s political regime in a given time period t, and β, the matrix of
parameter coefficients to be estimated:
μ ¼ expðXt; βþ tÞ (2)
The distribution (conditional likelihood) of a regime shift given the presence of
a terrorist attack can be expressed as:
Pr Y ¼ yijμt; α
  ¼ Γ yi þ α1ð Þ
Γ α1ð ÞΓ yt þ 1ð Þ
1
1þ αμt
 α1 αμt
1þ αμt
 yt
(3)
Given the possibility of endogeneity in political instability (i.e. previous period terror-
ism might induce current period terrorism), an additional test, the IV Poisson-GMM
estimator61 is used to account for the reality that macroeconomic and political outcomes
are the product of previous and concurrent political and economic conditions. This model
takes the general form of:
yi ¼ exp x0iβ1 þ y
0
2; iβ2
 
þ i (4)
Where the regime value (y) is a function of a matrix of exogenous regressors (x’),
endogenous regressors (shown in Equation 4 as y2), and an error term  (this model uses
additive errors). GMM estimation then uses instruments for the endogenous regressors
(denoted as to specify moment conditions that hold in the population, solving
aminimization problem tomake the sample-moment conditions as close to zero as is possible.
In this model, the endogenous regressor is assumed to be the proxy for political
instability under examination at that moment in time, with the instrumentation strategy
building on the vast literature on the economic and political determinants of terrorism. In
particular, prevailing theories of political instability posit that poverty per se may not be
a leading determinant of terroristic activity,62 but rather dislocation and disruption caused
by economic change.63 Poorer socio-economic environments also lower the opportunity
costs of terrorism, meaning that both lower levels of development and countries in
transition may be prone to political violence and instability.64 Moreover, highly publicized
(and especially successful) political violence may induce others to commit political
violence via a demonstration effect.65 Finally, there is a clear connection between political
repression and increases in terrorism or unrest,66 as nonviolent routes are closed off. To
accommodate all of these empirical findings, our instrument set uses lags of the regime
variable, previous political instability, and lags of the economic variables as instruments.67
As a final dive into this data, given that we are examining political institutions and
possible shifts, it may be interesting to look beyond average effects and see if political
violence had an effect in shifting Russia from a “low” and repressive state to a (relatively
more) liberal one. To that end, I also include a logistic regression (similar to,68 who
examines institutional change in Africa) which predicts the log odds (probability) of
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reaching the “higher” state of a more liberal Russia based on a one unit increase in the
political instability variables (whether discrete or cumulative events). Given the fact that
terrorism and unrest was clustered over Russia’s history, with some periods not having
any instability, I have eschewed a multinomial logit based on the three actual states of
Russia’s political institutes and collapsed the two Max Range categories 2 and 4 into one
“low” category and the category 17 as the “high” or “successful” category:
yt ¼ 1 if MaxRange ¼ 170 if MaxRange ¼ 2 or 4

(5)
With this binary variable created, we thus fashion a logistic regression as:
ln
pt
1 pt
 
¼ β0 þ β1PoliticalInstabilityt þ β2XRatet þ β3Goldt (6)
Given collinearity with Czarist transitions (and the infrequence of their occurrence),
the Czar dummy has been removed from this equation. Additionally, to counter hetero-
skedasticity of unknown form, robust standard errors are utilized in equation 6.
Results
Individual events
The first results of the tests of the effectiveness of individual acts of political violence in
nineteenth century Russia are shown in Tables 2 and 3. The negative binomial and the IV-
Poisson GMM regressions both model the Y variable, in this case the regime value, in log
form, and thus the interpretation of our output is that a one unit increase in political volatility
leads to an increase in the log count of the regime value by the value of the coefficient.
As can be seen across both the negative binominal (Table 2) and IV-Poisson regressions
(Table 3), there is a clear pattern in the correlations, with different types of political instability
having markedly different effects on political institutions in Czarist Russia—a result which
should be expected given the heterogeneity of deliberate political instability. In the first
instance, attempted assassinations in Russia have a small positive effect on the regime value
and attempted assassinations in the Empire have exactly the opposite effect, but in neither
case is there any statistical significance (either for the negative binomial or IV regressions).
This changes when we examine successful assassinations, however, as both assassinations in
Russia and the Empire appear to have had a salutary effect on the liberal stance of the Russian
regime. Individual acts of terrorism, perhaps by eliminating conservative and reactionary
officials, may have reassigned a greater weight to reformers in government, a reality which
was seen especially during the massive waves of killings from 1904–1907. With security
officials in particular being targeted, the overall shift in the elite in Russia moved toward
a more liberal stance, perhaps allowing for more support of reform.
Interestingly, collective acts of rebellion—perhaps by not targeting individual policy-
makers but the regime as an abstraction—have exactly the opposite effect, with unrest in
both Russia and throughout the Empire associated with much lower levels of liberal-
ization. Seen through an economic lens, the rationale behind this may be clear, as the Czar
had little incentive to assist those who pushed back against the system (a system which
protected his own privilege). Moreover, throughout Russian history, collective acts of
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Table 2. Results of negative binomial regressions, regime value versus political instability.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Terrorism variables
Attempted assassinations Russia 0.08
0.47
Attempted assassinations Empire −0.31
1.86*
Assassinations Russia 0.58
6.23***
Assassinations Empire 0.33
1.78*
Unrest Russia −0.167
3.08***
Unrest Empire −0.17
2.96***
External Conflict −0.18
3.00***
Control variables
Price of gold −0.02 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02
3.55*** 3.52*** 3.27*** 3.51*** 3.86*** 3.27*** 3.52***
Ruble/Guilder Exchange Rate −0.50 −0.51 −0.46 −0.50 −0.48 −0.48 −0.48
11.03*** 11.19*** 10.48*** 10.98*** 10.60*** 10.82*** 10.59***
Czar Transition −0.32 −0.30 −0.27 −0.30 −0.32 −0.32 −0.28
1.08 1.05 0.95 1.02 1.12 1.10 0.98
C 2.84 2.85 2.72 2.83 2.86 2.80 2.82
19.25*** 19.40*** 18.73*** 19.19*** 19.69*** 19.14*** 19.33***
R-squared 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
n 1157 1157 1157 1157 1157 1157 1157
Absolute value of t-statistics under coefficients. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels
respectively.
Table 3. Results of IV-poisson regressions, regime value versus political instability.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Terrorism variables
Attempted assassinations Russia 0.39
0.51
Attempted assassinations Empire −0.92
1.37
Assassinations Russia 1.54
8.87***
Assassinations Empire 1.17
3.10***
Unrest Russia −0.23
5.18***
Unrest Empire −0.22
6.12***
External Conflict −0.19
7.17***
Control variables
Price of gold −0.02 −0.02 −0.011 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02
7.96*** 7.93*** 4.29*** 7.49*** 7.44*** 7.14*** 7.82***
Ruble/Guilder Exchange Rate −0.77 −0.61 −0.38 −0.53 −0.68 −0.71 −0.78
10.05*** 10.65*** 4.31*** 9.31*** 11.83*** 12.16*** 13.03***
Czar Transition −0.45 −0.25 −0.16 −0.21 −0.33 −0.32 −0.31
1.77* 3.62*** 3.02*** 3.51*** 4.33*** 4.08*** 3.03***
C 3.22 2.87 2.31 2.69 3.15 3.09 3.27
18.64*** 20.22*** 11.24*** 18.80*** 21.06*** 21.45*** 21.90***
Hansen’s J-statistic p 0.2429 0.2456 0.17994 0.2624 0.1784 0.1922 0.1476
estimator two-step two-step two-step two-step IGMM IGMM IGMM
n 1123 1113 1123 1122 1119 1119 1123
Absolute value of t-statistics under coefficients. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels
respectively.
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unrest were usually targeted precisely against low-level “elites” (specific landowners or, as
in the 1880s and 1890s, factory owners) and represented economic grievances rather than
political ones. Once again, there was little incentive to open the political system for
instability which was essentially economic in nature.
Finally, as predicted by several scholars,69 the mobilization of military forces against
enemies domestic and foreign led to a decline in political liberalism across the board in
Russia; as shown in the last column of Tables 2 and 3, the indicator for external conflict
persistently shows a correlation with a lower regime variable. Randolph Bourne70
famously remarked that “war is the health of the state,” which in this case (and many
others) means more repression and a less-liberal political regime.
Cumulative events
The takeaways from this examination of singular acts of political instability appear to be
that targeting policymakers, rather than the system itself, was effective in effecting some
modicum of liberalization in Czarist Russia. But as noted above, one or two acts of
terrorism may be perceived as “black swans” by the populace and discounted appropri-
ately by lawmakers, but it is difficult to discount repeated and continuous political
instability. To that end, we examine the relationship between cumulative terrorism or
instability and political liberalization in Czarist Russia in Tables 4 and 5, using again
negative binomial and IV-Poisson methods. While the magnitude of the effect for cumu-
lative instability differs across the negative binomial and IV-Poisson regressions, the same
Table 4. Negative binomial regressions, regime value versus cumulative political instability.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Terrorism variables
Cumulative Attempted Assassinations Russia 0.05
1.16
Cumulative Attempted Assassinations Empire −0.05
1.35
Cumulative Assassinations Russia 0.16
13.19***
Cumulative Assassinations Empire 0.23
5.23***
Cumulative Unrest Russia −0.02
3.47***
Cumulative Unrest Empire −0.02
2.88***
Cumulative External Conflict −0.02
2.90***
Control variables
Price of gold −0.02 −0.02 −0.01 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02
3.53*** 3.34*** 2.53** 3.24*** 4.07*** 2.84*** 3.33***
Ruble/Guilder Exchange Rate −0.49 −0.51 −0.38 −0.45 −0.46 −0.48 −0.48
10.66*** 11.14*** 8.91*** 10.33*** 10.16*** 10.58*** 10.47***
Czar Transition −0.30 −0.31 −0.27 −0.27 −0.33 −0.31 0.28
1.04 1.05 1.00 0.95 1.15 1.09 0.97
C 2.82 2.84 2.41 2.69 2.88 2.75 2.80
18.94*** 19.28*** 17.39*** 18.57*** 19.90*** 18.43*** 19.03***
R-squared 0.10 0.10 0.27 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10
n 1157 1157 1157 1157 1157 1157 1157
Absolute value of t-statistics under coefficients. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels
respectively.
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relationships as found in the individual attacks hold: most prominently in the negative
binomial models (Table 4), successful assassinations correlate with higher levels of the
regime value while unrest and conflict correlate with lower values. Interestingly, when
instrumenting for cumulative terror (on the theory that previous instability can induce
more instability) in the IV-Poisson regressions (Table 5), we see the same results on
a greater scale, but with the added finding that attempted assassinations in the Empire also
pushed the Czar toward somewhat more liberalization. It is plausible thus that the waves
of terror in Russia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did in fact push the
Russian government to make concessions, especially in the periphery.
Effectiveness in changing regimes
Finally, we turn to the logistic regressions in Table 6, which examine if political instability
was associated with a higher or lower probability of escaping the “lower” regime value.
Using both the individual acts of political instability and cumulative instability, the log
odds shown here run broadly in line with the direction and significance found in the
previous models. In particular, there is no significant correlation between the probability
of reaching the higher state for attempted assassinations in Russia or cumulative assassi-
nation attempts in Russia or the Empire (the model containing attempted assassinations in
the Empire suffered from perfect prediction and was dropped). On the other hand,
successful assassinations in Russia in particular increase the odds as much as five times
Table 5. Results of IV-poisson regressions, regime value versus cumulative political instability.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Terrorism variables
Cumulative Attempted Assassinations Russia 0.26
0.96
Cumulative Attempted Assassinations Empire 0.46
7.13***
Cumulative Assassinations Russia 0.21
11.91***
Cumulative Assassinations Empire 0.16
2.87***
Cumulative Unrest Russia −0.11
2.71***
Cumulative Unrest Empire −0.11
2.37**
Cumulative External Conflict −0.02
5.42***
Control variables
Price of gold −0.02 −0.02 −0.01 −0.02 −0.04 −0.04 −0.02
6.85*** 6.97*** 4.33*** 7.93*** 5.15*** 4.78*** 7.03***
Ruble/Guilder Exchange Rate −0.64 −0.34 −0.32 −0.70 −0.40 −0.39 −0.78
3.26*** 5.53*** 4.66*** 11.45*** 2.98*** 2.62*** 12.98***
Czar Transition −0.34 −0.12 −0.23 −0.29 −0.41 −0.41 −0.31
3.22*** 2.88*** 3.84*** 3.70*** 5.48*** 5.36*** 3.05***
C 2.97 2.5 2.17 3.08 3.14 3.13 3.25
7.91*** 16.78*** 13.05*** 20.45*** 19.21*** 19.05*** 21.63***
Hansen’s J-statistic p 0.9847 0.3123 0.1391 0.1455 0.6975 0.4541 0.1283
estimator two-
step
two-
step
two-
step
two-
step
IGMM IGMM IGMM
n 1123 1113 1123 1123 1117 1119 1123
Absolute value of t-statistics under coefficients. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels
respectively.
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of reaching the higher regime value; at the same time, external conflict and unrest decrease
the likelihood of the country moving in a more liberal direction.
Conclusions
This paper has attempted to explore the effectiveness of terrorism and/or political instability
using the long history of terrorism in the Russian Empire as a test case. Using econometric
techniques which appropriately deal with the slow-moving nature of institutional change, the
examination shows that the removal of reactionary officials had a salutary effect in pushing the
Czarist system toward openness, especially in the late nineteenth century (as the cost of being
a Russian leader escalated immensely). On the other hand, collective action had
a counterproductive effect, at least until the country was weakened by the Great War.
As a first attempt at rigorously modeling the determinants of political change, this paper
should be seen as a complement to the many excellent works which exist detailing the history
of political violence in Russia71 instead of a replacement. Indeed, this work gives statistical
credibility to the theorized effects of political violence in both autocracies and countries
moving toward semi-democracy,72 as well as confirming the historical record on Russia’s
long road to (and abrupt end of) liberalization. A natural extension to the model here would
be to further develop the simple model utilized for Russia, delving deeper into the economic
correlates of change in political institutions and perhaps constructing better monthly series
than are currently available for nineteenth century Russia.
There are many extensions to this work beyond merely Russia, and center on both the
heterogeneity of political instability and moving toward a more formalized theory of
political change which incorporates this heterogeneity. One could also expand the simple
econometric model for Russia to check its external validity across countries: using panel
data, are the results similar in other countries in different time periods, or are the
heterogenous effects of various forms of instability unique to Russia and its political
system? Such an expansion may be easier to undertake for more modern forms of
terrorism or rebellion, with the caveat that the appropriate estimators must once again
account for slow-moving institutions. Finally, linkages can be built with the literature on
the economic drivers of terrorism to provide a more holistic picture of the role of political
instability on regime change, building on the work of 73 but explicitly incorporating how
prior instability, in all its guises, may weaken a regime.
In any event, the importance of these questions, and their relevance for understanding
political instability more broadly, means we should not aim low in exploring these ideas.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Summary statistics.
Variable Observations Mean Std. Deviation Min Max
MaxRange 1,510 4.5132 3.3915 2 17
Successful Assassinations Russia 1,510 0.0225 0.1484 0 1
Successful Assassinations Empire 1,510 0.0066 0.0811 0 1
Attempted Assassinations Russia 1,510 0.0073 0.0851 0 1
Attempted Assassinations Empire 1,510 0.0099 0.0992 0 1
Unrest Russia 1,510 0.1351 0.3419 0 1
Unrest Empire 1,510 0.1110 0.3143 0 1
External Conflict 1,510 0.1974 0.3981 0 1
Cumulative Assassinations Russia 1,510 0.2702 1.0283 0 9
Cumulative Assassinations Empire 1,510 0.0795 0.3752 0 4
Cumulative Attempted Assassinations Russia 1,510 0.0874 0.3608 0 3
Cumulative Attempted Assassinations Empire 1,510 0.1192 0.4666 0 3
Cumulative Unrest Russia 1,510 1.6132 2.8021 0 12
Cumulative Unrest Empire 1,510 1.3272 2.6205 0 12
Cumulative External Conflict 1,510 2.2927 4.2421 0 12
RUB/Guilder Exchange Rate 1,157 1.5942 0.5270 0.93 5.95
Price of Gold 1,510 21.0104 2.9830 19.39 52.29
Czar Transition 1,510 0.0046 0.0680 0 1
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Data Appendix
A number of sources were consulted for creating the database on political volatility in Russia during
the Czarist era. A complete list of scholarly literature and compilations from which the dating was
taken appears below:
Ascher, Abraham, P. A. Stolypin: The Search for Stability in Late Imperial Russia. Palo Alto:
Stanford University Press, 2002.
Crenshaw, Martha, Terrorism in Context. State College: Pennsylvania State University Press,
2010.
Donnorummo, Robert Pepe, The Peasants of Central Russia: Reactions to Emancipation and the
Market, 1850–1900. New York: Garland, 1987.
Friedgut, Theodore, Labor Violence and Regime Brutality in Czarist Russia: The Iuzovka
Cholera Riots of 1892.” Slavic Review 46, no. 2 (1987): 245–65.
Haberer, Eric, Jews and Revolution in Nineteenth Century Russia. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004.
Klibanov, Alexander, Problems of the Ideology of Peasant Movements (1850s–1860s). Russian
History 11, no. 2/3 (1984): 168–208.
Kolchin, Peter, Unfree Labor. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009.
Laqueur, Walter, A History of Terrorism. New York: Transaction Books, 2001.
Lauchlan, Iain, The Accidental Terrorist: Okhrana Connections to the Extreme-Right and the
Attempt to Assassinate Sergei Witte in 1907.” Revolutionary Russia 14, no. 2 (2001): 1–32.
Longley, David, Longman Companion to Imperial Russia, 1689–1917. New York: Routledge,
2014.
Mavor, Jonathan, An Economic History of Russia (Vol. 2). London: JM Dent & Sons, limited,
1914/1925.
Moon, David, Russian Peasants and Czarist Legislation on the Eve of Reform: Interaction between
Peasants and Officialdom, 1825–1855. Berlin: Springer, 1992.
Owen, Richard, Demonstrations in Russia 1876–1976. Index on Censorship 6, no. 1, (1977):
41–46.
Perris, George Herbert, Russia in Revolution. New York: Chapman & Hall, 1905.
Ruud, Charles, and Stepanov, Sergei, Fontanka 16: The Czars’ Secret Police. Toronto: McGill-
Queen’s Press, 1999.
Siljak, Ana, Angel of Vengeance: The Girl Who Shot the Governor of St. Petersburg and Sparked
the Age of Assassination. London: St. Martin’s Press, 2009.
Ulam, Adam, Prophets and Conspirators in Pre-Revolutionary Russia. New York: Transaction
Publishers, 1977.
Valk, Sigizmund Natanovich, Krest’ianskoe dvizhenie v Rossii v 1796–1825 gg.: sbornik doku-
mentov. Moscow: Akademia Nauk USSR, 1961.
Krest’ianskoe dvizhenie v Rossii v 1826–1849 gg.: sbornik dokumentov. Moscow: Akademia Nauk
USSR, 1961.
Vucinich, Wayne, and Curtiss, John Shelton, The Peasant in Nineteenth-century Russia. Palo
Alto: Stanford University Press, 1968.
In addition to these published works, a number of international newspapers were consulted to
double-check dates and ensure that consistency was kept with new-style dating as opposed to the
old-style dating used during the nineteenth century. These newspaper accounts were also used to
verify that these events were reported widely, with no discernible lag, so that the event actually
became a source of information for financial markets. Publication of these events around the globe
confirms that news of political volatility was widespread.
The full list of attempted assassinations, assassinations, unrest, and external conflict are available
at https://www.openicpsr.org/openicpsr/project/117682/version/V1/view/.
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